Looks like a total-loss fire happened overnight at a high rise apartment in the UK. It's early days but the aluminum composite skin is being blamed by some already as contributing to the fast spread.
I've done a little research this morning that tends to confirm that this has been an issue in Asia for a long time. Not sure if this is related to using cheap panels, or what. When we use them, we make sure they're tested (E-84), but is that enough?
Not sure what it would be in other countries, but in the US, NFPA 285 is what you should be looking for testing on. It's an assembly test so it tests more than just the panels; It tests the backup wall, any continuous insulation, support structure for the panels, etc. The intent is to see if a fire on one floor will migrate to the floor above on/through the cladding and support structure outside of the building.
Read through the IBC with regard to requirements for metal composite material cladding and you'll see the requirement for NFPA 285 tested assemblies.
Not sure what it would be in other countries, but in the US, NFPA 285 is what you should be looking for testing on. It's an assembly test so it tests more than just the panels; It tests the backup wall, any continuous insulation, support structure for the panels, etc. The intent is to see if a fire on one floor will migrate to the floor above on/through the cladding and support structure outside of the building.
Read through the IBC with regard to requirements for metal composite material cladding and you'll see the requirement for NFPA 285 tested assemblies.
Edit: See 2015 IBC Section 1407.
Jun 14, 17 10:59 am ·
·
JLC-1
it's a chimney effect, the cladded wall becomes a trombe wall with the heat.
Look for a NFPA-285 rating on MCM and ACM panels if your building is over 50'. It's been an issue for years; Fires in LasVegas, that big Dubai fire last year, etc.
They are not allowed by code in buildings over 3 storeys (or is it 6?) in Ontario. I'm out of the office all week so I can't double check my required standards but the building review people have been strict on these for a while in my area.
Jun 14, 17 11:45 am ·
·
bowling_ball
I just looked. This isn't really true. You can use it to any height you want as long as A) building is sprinklered, B) interior surface of wall assembly contains thermal barrier (ie 1/2" drywall), and C) wall assembly satisfies sentences 3 and 4 when tested according to CAN/ULC-S134.
Jun 14, 17 5:23 pm ·
·
bowling_ball
To the last point, I'm not sure exactly what this means as it's never come up in the office nor the AHJ.
Just because it doesn't come up in the office or with the AHJ doesn't mean it won't come back to bite you if you aren't in compliance. NFPA 285 was largely ignored when it first came out. Only in the past years, with more and more emphasis on continuous insulation in the energy codes, are AHJs starting to ask about it. However, even if they weren't the architect has to design to meet code. It doesn't matter whether the AHJ double checks their work or not.
Jun 14, 17 5:49 pm ·
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bowling_ball
As far as I can tell, NFPA 285 is not referenced once in the National Building Code of Canada.
Jun 14, 17 9:51 pm ·
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bowling_ball
I was more confused about the language in our code. I understand that the material has to be tested to S-134, which is something we check for.
I'm glad you raised this news item, bowling_ball. The images from the fire are terrifying. The recently-installed facade panels seem to have contributed to, or at least not prevented spread of, the fire.
I'm also shocked, though, that this 20+ story tower only had one egress stair (from what I can see in plans). If it recently;y went through a $10mil upgrade I wonder why the idea of adding another stair wasn't considered, or if it was suggested then VE'd out?
Terrifying. I'm going to try to feature this thread as I'd like us all to talk more about fire safety.
Jun 14, 17 1:22 pm ·
·
mightyaa
A person we have here gave a presentation once on the projects he worked on in London while with SOM. One stair isn't uncommon if you meet the travel distance requirements. I also heard they also have a 'stay in place and await rescue' sort of mentality versus exit the building.
As an aside, vertical fire propagation and requirements in the latest IBC to have NFPA 285 tested assemblies is not limited to just metal composite material cladding. Any foam plastic insulation used in the exterior wall requires it (this obviously includes EIFS systems). So do high-pressure decorative laminates (like Trespa) used for cladding, and any combustible weather-resistive barrier (good luck finding one that isn't, although you can get away with not needing it if you meet certain exceptions in the code). Even using combustible materials in supporting non-combustible claddings could be interpreted as needing to pass NFPA 285 testing.
Obviously the information above is generic and broad. There are exceptions and other criteria to look at in the code.
I'll have to look into this more. Great info, though we don't use IBC here and I can't say I've used this material except in small areas. The info about NFPA 285 is interesting but I've never run across any requirement for exterior vertical flame control that I can recall..... Hmmmm
Bowling, I'll have to get back to you on the OBC ruling. We certainly do have restrictions on building height and composite panels here in Ontario which do not exist in other provinces. I'm out of office all week but I'll chase it down when I get back.
Jun 14, 17 5:31 pm ·
·
bowling_ball
Sounds good to me. I found the reference you're referring to in NBCC but it's not an issue if the restrictions I mention above, are adhered to.
It looks like the Canadian equivalent to NFPA 285 is CAN/ULC S134. I haven't fully read the paper I got that from, so I'm not sure what the building codes up there would have for requiring it.
The paper also has a chart showing similar tests for other countries as well.
Edit: I just noticed bowling's comment above regarding CAN/ULC S134.
EI, from what I remember last time I came across ULC-S134, the conclusion was that very few composite panel manufacturer had yet to comply to testing. Even though they may be acceptable in the USA, a common problem is that many simply don't bother to test according to Canadian codes yet plenty of people specify them. Same goes with wired-glass and fire stopping systems.
Non, I can understand that issue. Only a few years ago I would call up manufacturers and ask about NFPA 285 testing and they would say, "NFP-what now?" The more the requirement gets enforced and the more architects ask about it, the more pressure there is on manufacturers to test their products in an assembly. It only takes one or two to start and the rest will follow.
Now I call manufacturers and they send me all sorts of information about NFPA 285 testing because they know that if they don't, they won't get selected and their competitors will.
A quick google search shows that all the major ACM manufacturers I am familiar with (and even some I hadn't heard of) have at least tested some assembly and passed CAN/ULC S134. The bigger question is whether or not the tested assembly works for your projects.
If they don't know about the testing or how to get it done, you could send them this youtube video from Intertek. A couple of years ago they claimed to be the only lab in the world to test to both NFPA 285 and CAN/ULC S134 under the same roof. One stop shopping!
Hey tintt - landlords actually do have to be licensed here normally if there is more than one family (ie. Flatmates) living in the same flat. In the case of Grenfell it was a council estate, who were eff to let the caretakers of the whole building (so common areas, etc.)
I saw the news on BBC in the morning; on realizing where the fire was from the report - I looked out the front door of my flat and could see the massive plume of smoke rising in the nearby distance. It was absolutely awfu to think of the effects; work wasn't much better as we play BBC in common areas. Everyone, even consultants/clients, were very quiet when I walked through the doors.
Jun 15, 17 12:02 pm ·
·
Bench
Looks like I may not have been 100% correct on this. It turns out Grenfell was actually managed by a for-profit company. This seems not to be a typical setup; in my borough it seems like all of the council-estates and ex-council estates are caretaken by the relevant council directly (garbage disposal, maintenance, etc.).
In one video sequence of the fire strings or strands of what could be molten or solidified light-colored plastic can be seen slowly descending in the air in front of the building. I assume aluminum could be ignited, as well ? I wonder if pieces of "foil" were to be found on the ground after the fire . . .
My guess would be PE from seeing the images and videos. If it was the FR core you'd see more of the panels left after the fire. It looks like they all burned up.
The Guardian is the reporting that the company who fabricated the panels for the tower was asked to supply the PE core rather than FR, implying it was a cost savings measure.
"He[, John Cowley, company director of Omnis Exteriors,] also said Omnis had been asked to supply Reynobond PE cladding, which is £2 cheaper per square metre than the alternative Reynobond FR, which stands for 'fire resistant' to the companies that worked on refurbishing Grenfell Tower."
Cowley said they supplied components for "a system created by the design and build team on that project." However, it isn't clear from the article whether the PE or the FR core was actually supplied. You could read into it either way. Did they supply what was asked for, or what was designed for. Who asked them to supply the PE core, the design and build team, or someone else?
Kirsty Wark on Newsnight Thursday in the UK made the most important point in this situation:
“If this was an aircraft the fleet would have been grounded"
Jun 16, 17 8:10 pm ·
·
Chuck71
The worst part is that there have been numerous incidents around the work with flammable cladding that should have made clear it wasn't acceptable.
Instead we have the installers saying the building regulations were followed, completely missing the point that compliance with building regulations cannot be done piecemeal. You can't do a building that is large and with a high risk accommodation, without considering it wholistically, and increasing risk in one part needs to be considered against lack of mitigation in another.
If nothing else, I expect all involved in this, including the Architects (and this project was by someone with a diploma working for the firm of Architects, and not someone registered as an Architect) to be bankrupted and sent out of business.
If for nothing else, but to be a lesson and a warning.
[FYI I've written to the UK Architects regulator ARB to query what investigations they are making into the conduct of the Architects who were responsible for the refurbishment of Grenfell House. Everyone else, please feel free to do the same]
I'm currently working on a project where we have 2 residential towers, both bigger than Grenfell House. We are doing the project to BS 9999, which is a bit of a problem as some of our designers are paying lip service to it, and not understanding the codes that BS9999 references that must also be followed. Our HVAC Engineers for one, arrogant as they are, are either denying problems in their design, or simply ignoring them (I've made it clear to my boss they need to be replaced, and others are doing the same).
Compared to Grenfell House, our buildings have these features (among others) included:
fully sprinklered, as they are above 30m high
wet rising main
2 separate fire escapes (in a scissor configuration) of about 1200mm width, both of which are pressurised
fire fighting lift
The stairs and lift are protected by a lobby which will have smoke extraction (when we get a new HVAC designer)
L1 detection system linked back to a fire command centre
compartmentation of 60 minutes between apartments, 120 minutes to the core
120 minutes separation between floors
internal partitions will generally get I expect 30 minute or 60 minute construction, by virtue of acoustic treatment
We haven't sorted out the facade design yet, but on Monday we rejected the contractors proposed Class B cladding, demanding that it must be at least Class A2, despite lack of any reference for it in the project. When I pressed the facade consultant, they insisted it was the right thing to do, i.e. let the Contractor claim if he doesn't like it.
None of us expected it would be shown to be so important 2 days later.
Still to be addressed is the question of vertical spread via the facade.
If the contractors design manager repeats his shite again about how a chimney affect doesn't happen behind a facade with a full height gap, ' trust me I know', I think I will ...I don't know. Try and remain professional, knowing I'm dealing with a moron commercial manager pretending to be an Architect?
Jun 17, 17 1:13 pm ·
·
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Alu Composite panels and combustibility
Looks like a total-loss fire happened overnight at a high rise apartment in the UK. It's early days but the aluminum composite skin is being blamed by some already as contributing to the fast spread. I've done a little research this morning that tends to confirm that this has been an issue in Asia for a long time. Not sure if this is related to using cheap panels, or what. When we use them, we make sure they're tested (E-84), but is that enough?
1 Featured Comment
Would ASTM E 84 testing be enough? No!
Not sure what it would be in other countries, but in the US, NFPA 285 is what you should be looking for testing on. It's an assembly test so it tests more than just the panels; It tests the backup wall, any continuous insulation, support structure for the panels, etc. The intent is to see if a fire on one floor will migrate to the floor above on/through the cladding and support structure outside of the building.
Read through the IBC with regard to requirements for metal composite material cladding and you'll see the requirement for NFPA 285 tested assemblies.
Edit: See 2015 IBC Section 1407.
All 23 Comments
Would ASTM E 84 testing be enough? No!
Not sure what it would be in other countries, but in the US, NFPA 285 is what you should be looking for testing on. It's an assembly test so it tests more than just the panels; It tests the backup wall, any continuous insulation, support structure for the panels, etc. The intent is to see if a fire on one floor will migrate to the floor above on/through the cladding and support structure outside of the building.
Read through the IBC with regard to requirements for metal composite material cladding and you'll see the requirement for NFPA 285 tested assemblies.
Edit: See 2015 IBC Section 1407.
it's a chimney effect, the cladded wall becomes a trombe wall with the heat.
Look for a NFPA-285 rating on MCM and ACM panels if your building is over 50'. It's been an issue for years; Fires in LasVegas, that big Dubai fire last year, etc.
They are not allowed by code in buildings over 3 storeys (or is it 6?) in Ontario. I'm out of the office all week so I can't double check my required standards but the building review people have been strict on these for a while in my area.
I just looked. This isn't really true. You can use it to any height you want as long as A) building is sprinklered, B) interior surface of wall assembly contains thermal barrier (ie 1/2" drywall), and C) wall assembly satisfies sentences 3 and 4 when tested according to CAN/ULC-S134.
To the last point, I'm not sure exactly what this means as it's never come up in the office nor the AHJ.
Just because it doesn't come up in the office or with the AHJ doesn't mean it won't come back to bite you if you aren't in compliance. NFPA 285 was largely ignored when it first came out. Only in the past years, with more and more emphasis on continuous insulation in the energy codes, are AHJs starting to ask about it. However, even if they weren't the architect has to design to meet code. It doesn't matter whether the AHJ double checks their work or not.
As far as I can tell, NFPA 285 is not referenced once in the National Building Code of Canada.
I was more confused about the language in our code. I understand that the material has to be tested to S-134, which is something we check for.
anyone know what the code/standard is in the UK?
Extremely strict, this was cost cutting and under the radar being covered up by the council. It's a social housing estate in a affluent area.
Watching footage of the fire, I'd say they were definitely a contributing factor to its spread. They were flaming up real good.
I'm glad you raised this news item, bowling_ball. The images from the fire are terrifying. The recently-installed facade panels seem to have contributed to, or at least not prevented spread of, the fire.
I'm also shocked, though, that this 20+ story tower only had one egress stair (from what I can see in plans). If it recently;y went through a $10mil upgrade I wonder why the idea of adding another stair wasn't considered, or if it was suggested then VE'd out?
Terrifying. I'm going to try to feature this thread as I'd like us all to talk more about fire safety.
A person we have here gave a presentation once on the projects he worked on in London while with SOM. One stair isn't uncommon if you meet the travel distance requirements. I also heard they also have a 'stay in place and await rescue' sort of mentality versus exit the building.
Also, a couple comments and link from TC here. But let's keep comments about this fire on this thread.
As an aside, vertical fire propagation and requirements in the latest IBC to have NFPA 285 tested assemblies is not limited to just metal composite material cladding. Any foam plastic insulation used in the exterior wall requires it (this obviously includes EIFS systems). So do high-pressure decorative laminates (like Trespa) used for cladding, and any combustible weather-resistive barrier (good luck finding one that isn't, although you can get away with not needing it if you meet certain exceptions in the code). Even using combustible materials in supporting non-combustible claddings could be interpreted as needing to pass NFPA 285 testing.
Obviously the information above is generic and broad. There are exceptions and other criteria to look at in the code.
I'll have to look into this more. Great info, though we don't use IBC here and I can't say I've used this material except in small areas. The info about NFPA 285 is interesting but I've never run across any requirement for exterior vertical flame control that I can recall..... Hmmmm
Sounds good to me. I found the reference you're referring to in NBCC but it's not an issue if the restrictions I mention above, are adhered to.
It looks like the Canadian equivalent to NFPA 285 is CAN/ULC S134. I haven't fully read the paper I got that from, so I'm not sure what the building codes up there would have for requiring it.
The paper also has a chart showing similar tests for other countries as well.
Edit: I just noticed bowling's comment above regarding CAN/ULC S134.
Non, I can understand that issue. Only a few years ago I would call up manufacturers and ask about NFPA 285 testing and they would say, "NFP-what now?" The more the requirement gets enforced and the more architects ask about it, the more pressure there is on manufacturers to test their products in an assembly. It only takes one or two to start and the rest will follow.
Now I call manufacturers and they send me all sorts of information about NFPA 285 testing because they know that if they don't, they won't get selected and their competitors will.
A quick google search shows that all the major ACM manufacturers I am familiar with (and even some I hadn't heard of) have at least tested some assembly and passed CAN/ULC S134. The bigger question is whether or not the tested assembly works for your projects.
If they don't know about the testing or how to get it done, you could send them this youtube video from Intertek. A couple of years ago they claimed to be the only lab in the world to test to both NFPA 285 and CAN/ULC S134 under the same roof. One stop shopping!
Maybe landlords should have to be licensed too....
I saw the news on BBC in the morning; on realizing where the fire was from the report - I looked out the front door of my flat and could see the massive plume of smoke rising in the nearby distance. It was absolutely awfu to think of the effects; work wasn't much better as we play BBC in common areas. Everyone, even consultants/clients, were very quiet when I walked through the doors.
Looks like I may not have been 100% correct on this. It turns out Grenfell was actually managed by a for-profit company. This seems not to be a typical setup; in my borough it seems like all of the council-estates and ex-council estates are caretaken by the relevant council directly (garbage disposal, maintenance, etc.).
Source:
https://www.citylab.com/equity/2017/06/grenfell-tower-fire/530262/
https://www.channel4.com/news/akala-people-died-in-london-fire-because-they-were-poor
This useful page was linked over at Dezeen:
http://www.probyn-miers.com/perspective/2016/02/fire-risks-from-external-cladding-panels-perspective-from-the-uk/
In one video sequence of the fire strings or strands of what could be molten or solidified light-colored plastic can be seen slowly descending in the air in front of the building. I assume aluminum could be ignited, as well ? I wonder if pieces of "foil" were to be found on the ground after the fire . . .
Could not help but note a $1 billion Calatrava London project unveiled recently. Words fail.
It would be interesting to know if the panels installed had an FR or PE core.
My guess would be PE from seeing the images and videos. If it was the FR core you'd see more of the panels left after the fire. It looks like they all burned up.
The Guardian is the reporting that the company who fabricated the panels for the tower was asked to supply the PE core rather than FR, implying it was a cost savings measure.
"He[, John Cowley, company director of Omnis Exteriors,] also said Omnis had been asked to supply Reynobond PE cladding, which is £2 cheaper per square metre than the alternative Reynobond FR, which stands for 'fire resistant' to the companies that worked on refurbishing Grenfell Tower."
Cowley said they supplied components for "a system created by the design and build team on that project." However, it isn't clear from the article whether the PE or the FR core was actually supplied. You could read into it either way. Did they supply what was asked for, or what was designed for. Who asked them to supply the PE core, the design and build team, or someone else?
Kirsty Wark on Newsnight Thursday in the UK made the most important point in this situation:
“If this was an aircraft the fleet would have been grounded"
The worst part is that there have been numerous incidents around the work with flammable cladding that should have made clear it wasn't acceptable.
Instead we have the installers saying the building regulations were followed, completely missing the point that compliance with building regulations cannot be done piecemeal. You can't do a building that is large and with a high risk accommodation, without considering it wholistically, and increasing risk in one part needs to be considered against lack of mitigation in another.
If nothing else, I expect all involved in this, including the Architects (and this project was by someone with a diploma working for the firm of Architects, and not someone registered as an Architect) to be bankrupted and sent out of business.
If for nothing else, but to be a lesson and a warning.
[FYI I've written to the UK Architects regulator ARB to query what investigations they are making into the conduct of the Architects who were responsible for the refurbishment of Grenfell House. Everyone else, please feel free to do the same]
I'm currently working on a project where we have 2 residential towers, both bigger than Grenfell House. We are doing the project to BS 9999, which is a bit of a problem as some of our designers are paying lip service to it, and not understanding the codes that BS9999 references that must also be followed. Our HVAC Engineers for one, arrogant as they are, are either denying problems in their design, or simply ignoring them (I've made it clear to my boss they need to be replaced, and others are doing the same).
Compared to Grenfell House, our buildings have these features (among others) included:
We haven't sorted out the facade design yet, but on Monday we rejected the contractors proposed Class B cladding, demanding that it must be at least Class A2, despite lack of any reference for it in the project. When I pressed the facade consultant, they insisted it was the right thing to do, i.e. let the Contractor claim if he doesn't like it.
None of us expected it would be shown to be so important 2 days later.
Still to be addressed is the question of vertical spread via the facade.
If the contractors design manager repeats his shite again about how a chimney affect doesn't happen behind a facade with a full height gap, ' trust me I know', I think I will ...I don't know. Try and remain professional, knowing I'm dealing with a moron commercial manager pretending to be an Architect?
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